James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 268 Lake Road P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093

315-342-3840



Michael J. Colomb Site Executive Officer

May 28, 1998 JAFP-98-0183

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Docket No. 50-333

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: LER-98-004

Manual Reactor Scram Due to a Rod Position Information System Power Supply Failure Resulting in Multiple Control Rod "Drift" Alarms

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)".

There are no commitments contained in this report.

Questions concerning this report may be addressed to Mr. Robert Steigerwald at (315) 349-6209.

Very truly yours,

MICHAEL J. COLOMB

MJC:RS:las Enclosure

cc:

USNRC, Region 1

USNRC Resident Inspector INPO Records Center

9804040105 980528 PDR ADOCK 05000333 S PDR IE):)|

NRC FORM 366

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

EXPINES U4/30/96
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

and a low old by land the co.

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

PAGE (3)

05000333

01 OF 05

TITLE (4)

Manual Reactor Scram Due to a Rod Position Information System Power Supply Failure Resulting in Multiple Control Rod "Drift" Alarms

EVENT DATE (5)				LER NUMBER	REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)								
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH DAY Y		YEAR	FACILITY NAME N/A		DO	O5000				
05	01	98	98	004	- 00	05	28	98	FACILITY N/A	NAME	DO	O5000				
OPERA	TING		THIS	REPORT IS SUBM	ITTED PURS	UANT TO	THE RI	QUIRE	MENTS (OF 10 CFR 5: (Check	one or mo	ore) (11)				
MODE (9)		N	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)						
POWER LEVEL (10)				20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)				
				100	100	100	100	100	100	20	20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)
			20).2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203	3(a)(4)		X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER				
			20).2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c	50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract be					
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.36(c)(2)			50,73(a)(2)(vii)		or in NRC Form 366A						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Robert Steigerwald, Sr. Licensing Engineer

(315) 349-6209

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	SYSTEM COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER F		MANUFACTURER	
E	AA	RJX	T329	Υ								
		SUPPLEMENTA	L REPORT EXPE	CTED (14)		EVE	PECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEA		

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On 05/01/98, 12:32 (EDT) a manual reactor scram from approximately 100% power was initiated due to multiple control rod drift indications in the control room. It was subsequently determined that the rods had not drifted and the cause of the rod drift indications and alarm was a Rod Position Information System (RPIS) power supply failure. The Control Room Operators demonstrated conservative decision making when faced with the unexpected indications and inserted a manual reactor scram. Following the scram, six control rods did not immediately indicate "full in" and Emergency Operating Procedure EOP-3, "Failure to Scram" was entered. At 12:45, all rods were verified fully inserted and EOP-3 was exited. Emergency plan entry conditions were reviewed and no entry was required. An Equipment Failure Evaluation, including extent of conditions, was completed for the RPIS power supply failure. Corrective actions include a preventive maintenance evaluation for this and similar power supplies to determine appropriate preventive maintenance tasks and frequencies.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)					PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER				
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	05000333	98	004		00	02	OF	05	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EIIS Codes are in []

Event Description:

On May 1, 1998, 12:32 (EDT) a manual reactor scram from approximately 100 percent power was initiated due to multiple control rod [AA] drift indications in the control room. It was subsequently determined that the rods had not drifted and the cause of the rod drift indications and alarm was a Rod Position Information System (RPIS) power supply failure. The Control Room Operators demonstrated conservative decision making when faced with the unexpected indications and inserted a manual reactor scram.

At 12:32:02 on May 1, 1998, a "rod drift" alarm was received in the control room for rod 42-47. A Control Room Operator announced the alarm to the control room staff. Within seconds of the first alarm other control rod drift indications were received. The Control Room Operator selected rod 42-47 and the position indication for this rod was blank on the four rod display. The Control Room Supervisor directed a manual reactor scram which was carried out by the Control Room Operator at 12:32:14. The Intermediate Range and Source Range monitors were inserted and the Average Power Range Monitors were verified downscale.

Reactor water level dropped as a result of the scram. The high pressure injection systems, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) [BN] and High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) [BJ], initiated on low level but did not inject due to the short duration of the initiation signal. Both Reactor Water Recirculation pumps [AD] tripped and a Group II containment isolation [JM] occurred on low level. Reactor water level recovered due to normal feedwater [SJ] injection. The Main turbine [TA] tripped on reverse power prior to actuation of the high reactor water level trip. The HPCI, RCIC, and "B" Feedpump turbines tripped on high reactor water level approximately 30 seconds after the scram. Water level reached a maximum of approximately 231 inches at 12:32:45. At 12:41 the "B" Feedpump was restarted and normal level control with the feedwater system was established. No safety relief valves were actuated.

Following the scram, six control rods did not immediately indicate "full in" and EOP-3, "Failure to Scram" was entered. Three of the control rods were verified inserted after replacing burnt-out light bulbs in their associated full core display modules. A computer generated full core rod scan was unsuccessful due to the failed RPIS inputs. At 12:45 the three rods with unknown positions were given momentary "insert" signals. The three rods then indicated "full in" and EOP-3 was exited. All rods were re-verified fully inserted. The Control Room Operator utilized Abnormal Operating Procedure, AOP-1, "Reactor Scram" to provide the momentary insert signals to the three control rods instead of EP-3, "Alternate Rod

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET		LER NUMBER	PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	05000333	98	004	00	03 OF	05

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Event Description: (cont'd.)

Insertion", as directed by EOP-3. The actions to provide insert signals to the control rods are essentially the same from either procedure. At 12:54 the scram was reset. Emergency plan entry conditions were reviewed and no entry was required.

Cause:

The cause of the multiple rod drift alarms was due to a +5 VDC RPIS power supply, 03PSY5, failure (Cause Code E). The equipment failure evaluation determined that the failure of the power supply was the result of overheating of internal components due to a failed internal cooling fan. The overheating caused failure of the regulating circuit that caused the output voltage to increase from a nominal +5 VDC to approximately +10VDC. This failure caused multiple rod positions to indicate a "drift" condition with a loss of position information. No control rods actually moved until the insertion of the manual scram.

The power supply, 03PSY5, was original plant equipment and was in service since 1974 with no documented failures. The power supply was not in the Preventive Maintenance Program, nor were there any preventive maintenance tasks performed on 03PSY5 per the work history database. The failure of the 03PSY5 power supply is attributed to a failed internal cooling fan which allowed the power supply to overheat causing failure of the regulator circuit. The internal cooling fan was found in a seized condition.

Extent of Conditions:

An extent of conditions evaluation was performed as part of the trouble-shooting and repair effort. The following is a summary of the results of the extent of conditions review effort. The 03PSY5 power supply provides power to the logic chips on the printed circuit boards located in the RPIS "Y-page". All "Y-page" logic chips were stressed as a result of the over-voltage condition. It was determined that printed circuit cards on the "X-page" were not effected. The critical circuit cards associated with the "Y-page" were tested satisfactorily or replaced. Similar power supplies 03PSX5 and 03PSX28 were replaced.

Analysis

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)".

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET		PAGE (3)					
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER		0.5	0.5
	05000333	98	004		00	04	OF	05

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Analysis (cont'd.)

The plant responded as designed following the manual scram from approximately 100 percent power. There were no challenges to the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the fuel cladding integrity. This event and the transient response is bounded by previous James A. FitzPatrick Final Safety Analysis Report analyses including various generation load reject transients, turbine trip transients, and reactor isolation transients. Reactor pressure, reactor vessel level, and neutron flux response were consistent with these analyses. Therefore, the safety significance of this event was minimal.

The operators demonstrated conservative decision-making when they encountered multiple rod drift alarms by promptly inserting a manual scram. During the transient there were no other protection or control systems out of service. The operators verified that all control rods had inserted by observing APRMs downscale, the full core display and individual rod position indications.

Corrective Actions:

- 1. A Post Transient Evaluation was performed and completed prior to start up.
- 2. An Extent of Conditions evaluation regarding the RPIS 03PSY5 failure was completed prior to startup. Associated critical circuit cards and power supplies were either tested satisfactorily or replaced as a result of the evaluations.
- 3. An Equipment Failure Evaluation to determine the cause of the power supply failure was completed.
- 4. An evaluation will be done to determine the need to perform Preventive Maintenance Evaluations on those systems not previously addressed during an earlier Preventive Maintenance Evaluation effort.

 Scheduled to be completed June 30, 1998.
- 5. Appropriate preventive maintenance tasks and frequencies will be identified and assigned to important power supplies not currently in the Preventive Maintenance Program.

 Scheduled to be completed August 30, 1998.
- 6. A review of the appropriateness of current PM tasks and frequencies for components of the Reactor Manual Control System, Reactor Position Information System, Rod Worth Minimizer, and Rod Sequence Control System will be done.

 Scheduled to be completed August 30, 1998.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)					PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER				0.5	-	
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	05000333	98	004		00	05	OF	05	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Corrective Actions: (cont'd.)

7. The use of EP-3 versus AOP-1, for inserting control rods while in EOP-3, was reviewed by each operating crew prior to startup (ACT-98-32426). The use of the correct procedures will also be reviewed during Licensed Operator Requalification Training.

Scheduled to be complete August 1, 1998.

Similar Events:

None

Failed Component Identification:

Manufacturer: TRYGON
Model Number: L5R6-70
EPIX (NPRDS) Manufacturer Code: T329
EPIX (NPRDS) Component Code: RJX

CATEGORY 1

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCECCTO	M MDD.0006040105	DOC 1	חאיידי (98/05/28 NOTARIZED	· NO		DOCKET #
				lear Power Plant, Po		utho	
AUTH.N				rear rower rranc, re	JWCI 23	u ciio	03000333
COLOMB,				he State of New Yorl	c (New	York	Power Au
RECIP.					,		
				ranch (Document Cont	trol D	esk)	
SUBJECT	: Forwards LER 98-	004-00	re in:	itiation of manual	reacto	r scra	ım.
	due to rod posit	ion in:	fo sys	power supply failur	re.No		C
	commitments cont	ained :	in rep	t.			C
						1	L A
	UTION CODE: IE22T				SIZE		
TITLE:	50.73/50.9 License	e Even	t Repor	rt (LER), Incident l	Rpt, e	tc.	T
							-
NOTES:							E
	DECIDIENT	COPI	n C	RECIPIENT	COP	TEC	
	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME		ENCL	ID CODE/NAME		ENCL	G
	PD1-1 PD	1	1	WILLIAMS, J	1	1	
	PDI-I PD	_	_	WIDDIAMS, C	_	_	0
INTERNAL:	AEOD/SPD/RAB	2	2	AEOD/SPD/RRAB	1	1	
	FILE CENTER	1	1	NRR/DE/ECGB	1	1	R
	NRR/DE/EELB	1	1	NRR/DE/EMEB	1	1	Y
	NRR/DRCH/HHFB	1	1	NRR/DRCH/HICB	1	1	Y
	NRR/DRCH/HOLB	1	1	NRR/DRCH/HQMB	1	1	
	NRR/DRPM/PECB	1	1	NRR/DSSA/SPLB	1	1	1
	NRR/DSSA/SRXB	1	1	RES/DET/EIB	1	1	-
	RGN1 FILE 01	1	1				
					5	2	
EXTERNAL:	L ST LOBBY WARD	1	1 <	LITCO BRYCE, J H	1	1	D
	NOAC POORE, W.	1	1	NOAC QUEENER, DS	1	1	
	NRC PDR	1	T	NUDOCS FULL TXT	1	1	0
							4.5
							C
							-
							ט
							м
							M
							E
							-
							N

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083

T